keyboard_tab Digital Market Act 2022/1925 EN

1.   If, during proceedings under Article 18, the gatekeeper concerned offers commitments for the relevant core_platform_services to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5, 6 and 7 the Commission may adopt an implementing act making those commitments binding on that gatekeeper and declare that there are no further grounds for action. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 50(2).

2.   The Commission may, upon request or on its own initiative, reopen by decision the relevant proceedings, where:

(a)	there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the decision was based;

(b)	the gatekeeper concerned acts contrary to its commitments;

(c)	the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information provided by the parties;

(d)	the commitments are not effective.

3.   If the Commission considers that the commitments submitted by the gatekeeper concerned cannot ensure effective compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5, 6 and 7, it shall explain the reasons for not making those commitments binding in the decision concluding the relevant proceedings.

1.   Gatekeepers shall introduce a compliance function, which is independent from the operational functions of the gatekeeper and composed of one or more compliance officers, including the head of the compliance function.

2.   The gatekeeper shall ensure that the compliance function referred to in paragraph 1 has sufficient authority, stature and resources, as well as access to the management body of the gatekeeper to monitor the compliance of the gatekeeper with this Regulation.

3.   The management body of the gatekeeper shall ensure that compliance officers appointed pursuant to paragraph 1 have the professional qualifications, knowledge, experience and ability necessary to fulfil the tasks referred to in paragraph 5.

The management body of the gatekeeper shall also ensure that such head of the compliance function is an independent senior manager with distinct responsibility for the compliance function.

4.   The head of the compliance function shall report directly to the management body of the gatekeeper and may raise concerns and warn that body where risks of non-compliance with this Regulation arise, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the management body in its supervisory and managerial functions.

The head of the compliance function shall not be removed without prior approval of the management body of the gatekeeper.

5.   Compliance officers appointed by the gatekeeper pursuant to paragraph 1 shall have the following tasks:

(a)	organising, monitoring and supervising the measures and activities of the gatekeepers that aim to ensure compliance with this Regulation;

(b)	informing and advising the management and employees of the gatekeeper on compliance with this Regulation;

(c)	where applicable, monitoring compliance with commitments made binding pursuant to Article 25, without prejudice to the Commission being able to appoint independent external experts pursuant to Article 26(2);

(d)	cooperating with the Commission for the purpose of this Regulation.

6.   Gatekeepers shall communicate the name and contact details of the head of the compliance function to the Commission.

7.   The management body of the gatekeeper shall define, oversee and be accountable for the implementation of the governance arrangements of the gatekeeper that ensure the independence of the compliance function, including the division of responsibilities in the organisation of the gatekeeper and the prevention of conflicts of interest.

8.   The management body shall approve and review periodically, at least once a year, the strategies and policies for taking up, managing and monitoring the compliance with this Regulation.

9.   The management body shall devote sufficient time to the management and monitoring of compliance with this Regulation. It shall actively participate in decisions relating to the management and enforcement of this Regulation and ensure that adequate resources are allocated to it.

1.   The Commission shall adopt an implementing act setting out its finding of non-compliance (‘the non-compliance decision’) where it finds that a gatekeeper does not comply with one or more of the following:

(a)	any of the obligations laid down in Article 5, 6 or 7;

(b)	measures specified by the Commission in a decision adopted pursuant to Article 8(2);

(c)	remedies imposed pursuant to Article 18(1);

(d)	interim measures ordered pursuant to Article 24; or

(e)	commitments made legally binding pursuant to Article 25.

That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 50(2).

2.   The Commission shall endeavour to adopt its non-compliance decision within 12 months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 20.

3.   Before adopting the non-compliance decision, the Commission shall communicate its preliminary findings to the gatekeeper concerned. In those preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain the measures it is considering taking or that it considers that the gatekeeper should take in order to effectively address the preliminary findings.

4.   Where it intends to adopt a non-compliance decision, the Commission may consult third parties.

5.   In the non-compliance decision, the Commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with that decision.

6.   The gatekeeper shall provide the Commission with the description of the measures that it has taken to ensure compliance with the non-compliance decision.

7.   Where the Commission decides not to adopt a non-compliance decision, it shall close the proceedings by a decision.

1.   In the non-compliance decision, the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10 % of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper, intentionally or negligently, fails to comply with:

(a)	any of the obligations laid down in Articles 5, 6 and 7;

(b)	measures specified by the Commission in a decision adopted pursuant to Article 8(2);

(c)	remedies imposed pursuant to Article 18(1);

(d)	interim measures ordered pursuant to Article 24; or

(e)	commitments made legally binding pursuant to Article 25.

2.   Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, in the non-compliance decision the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines up to 20 % of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that a gatekeeper has committed the same or a similar infringement of an obligation laid down in Article 5, 6 or 7 in relation to the same core_platform_service as it was found to have committed in a non-compliance decision adopted in the 8 preceding years.

3.   The Commission may adopt a decision, imposing on undertakings, including gatekeepers where applicable, and associations of undertakings, fines not exceeding 1 % of their total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently:

(a)	fail to provide within the time limit information that is required for assessing their designation as gatekeepers pursuant to Article 3 or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information;

(b)	fail to comply with the obligation to notify the Commission according to Article 3(3);

(c)	fail to notify information or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information that is required pursuant to Article 14;

(d)	fail to submit the description or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information that is required pursuant to Article 15;

(e)	fail to provide access to data, algorithms or information about testing in response to a request made pursuant to Article 21(3);

(f)	fail to supply the information requested within the time limit fixed pursuant to Article 21(3) or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or explanations that are requested pursuant to Article 21 or given in an interview pursuant to Article 22;

(g)	fail to rectify within a time limit set by the Commission, incorrect, incomplete or misleading information given by a representative or a member of staff, or fail or refuse to provide complete information on facts relating to the subject-matter and purpose of an inspection, pursuant to Article 23;

(h)	refuse to submit to an inspection pursuant to Article 23;

(i)	fail to comply with the obligations imposed by the Commission pursuant to Article 26;

(j)	fail to introduce a compliance function in accordance with Article 28; or

(k)	fail to comply with the conditions for access to the Commission’s file pursuant to Article 34(4).

4.   In fixing the amount of a fine, the Commission shall take into account the gravity, duration, recurrence, and, for fines imposed pursuant to paragraph 3, delay caused to the proceedings.

5.   When a fine is imposed on an association of undertakings taking account of the worldwide turnover of its members and that association is not solvent, it shall be obliged to call for contributions from its members to cover the amount of the fine.

Where such contributions have not been made to the association of undertakings within a time limit set by the Commission, the Commission may require payment of the fine directly by any of the undertakings whose representatives were members of the decision-making bodies concerned of that association.

After having required payment in accordance with the second subparagraph, the Commission may require payment of the balance by any of the members of the association of undertakings, where necessary to ensure full payment of the fine.

However, the Commission shall not require payment pursuant to the second or the third subparagraph from undertakings which show that they have not implemented the decision of the association of undertakings that infringed this Regulation, and either were not aware of its existence, or have actively distanced themselves from it before the Commission opened proceedings under Article 20.

The financial liability of each undertaking in respect of the payment of the fine shall not exceed 20 % of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year.

1.   The Commission may adopt a decision imposing on undertakings, including gatekeepers where applicable, and associations of undertakings periodic penalty payments not exceeding 5 % of the average daily worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year per day, calculated from the date set by that decision, in order to compel them:

(a)	to comply with the measures specified by the Commission in a decision adopted pursuant to Article 8(2);

(b)	to comply with the decision pursuant to Article 18(1);

(c)	to supply correct and complete information within the time limit required by a request for information made by decision pursuant to Article 21;

(d)	to ensure access to data, algorithms and information about testing in response to a request made pursuant to Article 21(3) and to supply explanations on those as required by a decision pursuant to Article 21;

(e)	to submit to an inspection which was ordered by a decision taken pursuant to Article 23;

(f)	to comply with a decision ordering interim measures taken pursuant to Article 24;

(g)	to comply with commitments made legally binding by a decision pursuant to Article 25(1);

(h)	to comply with a decision pursuant to Article 29(1).

2.   Where the undertakings, or associations of undertakings, have satisfied the obligation which the periodic penalty payment was intended to enforce, the Commission may adopt an implementing act, setting the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment at a figure lower than that which would arise under the original decision. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 50(2).