keyboard_tab Digital Market Act 2022/1925 EN
BG CS DA DE EL EN ES ET FI FR GA HR HU IT LV LT MT NL PL PT RO SK SL SV print pdf
- 1 Article 18 Market investigation into systematic non-compliance
- 4 Article 30 Fines
CHAPTER I
SUBJECT MATTER, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
CHAPTER II
GATEKEEPERS
CHAPTER III
PRACTICES OF GATEKEEPERS THAT LIMIT CONTESTABILITY OR ARE UNFAIR
CHAPTER IV
MARKET INVESTIGATION
CHAPTER V
INVESTIGATIVE, ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING POWERS
CHAPTER VI
FINAL PROVISIONS
- gatekeeper
- core platform service
- information society service
- digital sector
- online intermediation services
- online search engine
- online social networking service
- video-sharing platform service
- number-independent interpersonal communications service
- operating system
- web browser
- virtual assistant
- cloud computing service
- software application stores
- software application
- payment service
- technical service supporting payment service
- payment system for in-app purchases
- identification service
- end user
- business user
- ranking
- search results
- data
- personal data
- non-personal data
- undertaking
- control
- interoperability
- turnover
- profiling
- consent
- national court
- General
- Active end users
- Active business users
- Submission of information
- Specific definitions
- article 29
- commission 27
- pursuant 23
- shall 16
- gatekeeper 15
- fail 11
- information 10
- within 10
- decision 10
- non-compliance 9
- undertakings 8
- investigation 7
- market 7
- association 6
- article 6
- payment 6
- which 6
- remedies 6
- fine 6
- worldwide 5
- turnover 5
- fines 5
- such 5
- accordance 5
- total 5
- time 5
- financial 5
- imposed 5
- in 5
- have 5
- preceding 5
- incorrect 5
- down 5
- laid 5
- obligations 5
- systematic 5
- supply 5
- from 5
- misleading 5
- incomplete 5
- comply 4
- the 4
- preliminary 4
- findings 4
- members 4
- paragraph 4
- provide 4
- year 4
- and 4
- necessary 4
Article 18
Market investigation into systematic non-compliance
1. The Commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a gatekeeper has engaged in systematic non-compliance. The Commission shall conclude that market investigation within 12 months from the date referred to in Article 16(3), point (a). Where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed one or more of the obligations laid down in Article 5, 6 or 7 and has maintained, strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the requirements set out in Article 3(1), the Commission may adopt an implementing act imposing on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate and necessary to ensure effective compliance with this Regulation. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 50(2).
2. The remedy imposed in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article may include, to the extent that such remedy is proportionate and necessary in order to maintain or restore fairness and contestability as affected by the systematic non-compliance, the prohibition, during a limited period, for the gatekeeper to enter into a concentration within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 regarding the core_platform_services or the other services provided in the digital_sector or enabling the collection of data that are affected by the systematic non-compliance.
3. A gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5, 6 and 7, where the Commission has issued at least three non-compliance decisions pursuant to Article 29 against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core_platform_services within a period of 8 years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this Article.
4. The Commission shall communicate its preliminary findings to the gatekeeper concerned within 6 months from the date referred to in Article 16(3), point (a). In its preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain whether it preliminarily considers that the conditions of paragraph 1 of this Article are met and which remedy or remedies it preliminarily considers necessary and proportionate.
5. In order to enable interested third parties to effectively provide comments, the Commission shall, at the same time as communicating its preliminary findings to the gatekeeper pursuant to paragraph 4 or as soon as possible thereafter, publish a non-confidential summary of the case and the remedies that it is considering imposing. The Commission shall specify a reasonable timeframe within which such comments are to be provided.
6. Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article by making commitments offered by the gatekeeper pursuant to Article 25 binding, it shall publish a non-confidential summary of the case and the main content of the commitments. Interested third parties may submit their comments within a reasonable timeframe which shall be set by the Commission.
7. In the course of the market investigation, the Commission may extend its duration where such extension is justified on objective grounds and proportionate. The extension may apply to the deadline by which the Commission has to issue its preliminary findings, or to the deadline for adoption of the final decision. The total duration of any extension or extensions pursuant to this paragraph shall not exceed 6 months.
8. In order to ensure effective compliance by the gatekeeper with its obligations laid down in Articles 5, 6 and 7, the Commission shall regularly review the remedies that it imposes in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article. The Commission shall be entitled to modify those remedies if, following a new market investigation, it finds that they are not effective.
Article 30
Fines
1. In the non-compliance decision, the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10 % of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper, intentionally or negligently, fails to comply with:
| (a) | any of the obligations laid down in Articles 5, 6 and 7; |
| (b) | measures specified by the Commission in a decision adopted pursuant to Article 8(2); |
| (c) | remedies imposed pursuant to Article 18(1); |
| (d) | interim measures ordered pursuant to Article 24; or |
| (e) | commitments made legally binding pursuant to Article 25. |
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, in the non-compliance decision the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines up to 20 % of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that a gatekeeper has committed the same or a similar infringement of an obligation laid down in Article 5, 6 or 7 in relation to the same core_platform_service as it was found to have committed in a non-compliance decision adopted in the 8 preceding years.
3. The Commission may adopt a decision, imposing on undertakings, including gatekeepers where applicable, and associations of undertakings, fines not exceeding 1 % of their total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently:
| (a) | fail to provide within the time limit information that is required for assessing their designation as gatekeepers pursuant to Article 3 or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information; |
| (b) | fail to comply with the obligation to notify the Commission according to Article 3(3); |
| (c) | fail to notify information or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information that is required pursuant to Article 14; |
| (d) | fail to submit the description or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information that is required pursuant to Article 15; |
| (e) | fail to provide access to data, algorithms or information about testing in response to a request made pursuant to Article 21(3); |
| (f) | fail to supply the information requested within the time limit fixed pursuant to Article 21(3) or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or explanations that are requested pursuant to Article 21 or given in an interview pursuant to Article 22; |
| (g) | fail to rectify within a time limit set by the Commission, incorrect, incomplete or misleading information given by a representative or a member of staff, or fail or refuse to provide complete information on facts relating to the subject-matter and purpose of an inspection, pursuant to Article 23; |
| (h) | refuse to submit to an inspection pursuant to Article 23; |
| (i) | fail to comply with the obligations imposed by the Commission pursuant to Article 26; |
| (j) | fail to introduce a compliance function in accordance with Article 28; or |
| (k) | fail to comply with the conditions for access to the Commission’s file pursuant to Article 34(4). |
4. In fixing the amount of a fine, the Commission shall take into account the gravity, duration, recurrence, and, for fines imposed pursuant to paragraph 3, delay caused to the proceedings.
5. When a fine is imposed on an association of undertakings taking account of the worldwide turnover of its members and that association is not solvent, it shall be obliged to call for contributions from its members to cover the amount of the fine.
Where such contributions have not been made to the association of undertakings within a time limit set by the Commission, the Commission may require payment of the fine directly by any of the undertakings whose representatives were members of the decision-making bodies concerned of that association.
After having required payment in accordance with the second subparagraph, the Commission may require payment of the balance by any of the members of the association of undertakings, where necessary to ensure full payment of the fine.
However, the Commission shall not require payment pursuant to the second or the third subparagraph from undertakings which show that they have not implemented the decision of the association of undertakings that infringed this Regulation, and either were not aware of its existence, or have actively distanced themselves from it before the Commission opened proceedings under Article 20.
The financial liability of each undertaking in respect of the payment of the fine shall not exceed 20 % of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year.
whereas