keyboard_tab Digital Market Act 2022/1925 EN

1.   Any third party, including business_users, competitors or end-users of the core_platform_services listed in the designation decision pursuant to Article 3(9), as well as their representatives, may inform the national competent authority of the Member State, enforcing the rules referred to in Article 1(6), or the Commission directly, about any practice or behaviour by gatekeepers that falls within the scope of this Regulation.

2.   The national competent authority of the Member State, enforcing the rules referred to in Article 1(6), and the Commission shall have full discretion as regards the appropriate measures and are under no obligation to follow-up on the information received.

3.   Where the national competent authority of the Member State, enforcing the rules referred to in Article 1(6), determines, based on the information received pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, that there may be an issue of non-compliance with this Regulation, it shall transfer that information to the Commission.

1.   In the non-compliance decision, the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10 % of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper, intentionally or negligently, fails to comply with:

(a)	any of the obligations laid down in Articles 5, 6 and 7;

(b)	measures specified by the Commission in a decision adopted pursuant to Article 8(2);

(c)	remedies imposed pursuant to Article 18(1);

(d)	interim measures ordered pursuant to Article 24; or

(e)	commitments made legally binding pursuant to Article 25.

2.   Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, in the non-compliance decision the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines up to 20 % of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that a gatekeeper has committed the same or a similar infringement of an obligation laid down in Article 5, 6 or 7 in relation to the same core_platform_service as it was found to have committed in a non-compliance decision adopted in the 8 preceding years.

3.   The Commission may adopt a decision, imposing on undertakings, including gatekeepers where applicable, and associations of undertakings, fines not exceeding 1 % of their total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently:

(a)	fail to provide within the time limit information that is required for assessing their designation as gatekeepers pursuant to Article 3 or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information;

(b)	fail to comply with the obligation to notify the Commission according to Article 3(3);

(c)	fail to notify information or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information that is required pursuant to Article 14;

(d)	fail to submit the description or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information that is required pursuant to Article 15;

(e)	fail to provide access to data, algorithms or information about testing in response to a request made pursuant to Article 21(3);

(f)	fail to supply the information requested within the time limit fixed pursuant to Article 21(3) or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or explanations that are requested pursuant to Article 21 or given in an interview pursuant to Article 22;

(g)	fail to rectify within a time limit set by the Commission, incorrect, incomplete or misleading information given by a representative or a member of staff, or fail or refuse to provide complete information on facts relating to the subject-matter and purpose of an inspection, pursuant to Article 23;

(h)	refuse to submit to an inspection pursuant to Article 23;

(i)	fail to comply with the obligations imposed by the Commission pursuant to Article 26;

(j)	fail to introduce a compliance function in accordance with Article 28; or

(k)	fail to comply with the conditions for access to the Commission’s file pursuant to Article 34(4).

4.   In fixing the amount of a fine, the Commission shall take into account the gravity, duration, recurrence, and, for fines imposed pursuant to paragraph 3, delay caused to the proceedings.

5.   When a fine is imposed on an association of undertakings taking account of the worldwide turnover of its members and that association is not solvent, it shall be obliged to call for contributions from its members to cover the amount of the fine.

Where such contributions have not been made to the association of undertakings within a time limit set by the Commission, the Commission may require payment of the fine directly by any of the undertakings whose representatives were members of the decision-making bodies concerned of that association.

After having required payment in accordance with the second subparagraph, the Commission may require payment of the balance by any of the members of the association of undertakings, where necessary to ensure full payment of the fine.

However, the Commission shall not require payment pursuant to the second or the third subparagraph from undertakings which show that they have not implemented the decision of the association of undertakings that infringed this Regulation, and either were not aware of its existence, or have actively distanced themselves from it before the Commission opened proceedings under Article 20.

The financial liability of each undertaking in respect of the payment of the fine shall not exceed 20 % of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year.

1.   The Commission shall establish a high-level group for the Digital Markets Act (‘the high-level group’).

2.   The high-level group shall be composed of the following European bodies and networks:

(a)	Body of the European Regulators for Electronic Communications;

(b)	European Data Protection Supervisor and European Data Protection Board;

(c)	European Competition Network;

(d)	Consumer Protection Cooperation Network; and

(e)	European Regulatory Group of Audiovisual Media Regulators.

3.   The European bodies and networks referred to in paragraph 2 shall each have an equal number of representatives in the high-level group. The maximum number of members of the high-level group shall not exceed 30.

4.   The Commission shall provide secretariat services to the high-level group in order to facilitate its work. The high-level group shall be chaired by the Commission, which shall participate in its meetings. The high-level group shall meet upon request of the Commission at least once per calendar year. The Commission shall also convene a meeting of the group when so requested by the majority of the members composing the group in order to address a specific issue.

5.   The high-level group may provide the Commission with advice and expertise in the areas falling within the competences of its members, including:

(a)	advice and recommendations within their expertise relevant for any general matter of implementation or enforcement of this Regulation; or

(b)	advice and expertise promoting a consistent regulatory approach across different regulatory instruments.

6.   The high-level group may, in particular, identify and assess the current and potential interactions between this Regulation and the sector-specific rules applied by the national authorities composing the European bodies and networks referred to in paragraph 2 and submit an annual report to the Commission presenting such assessment and identifying potential trans-regulatory issues. Such report may be accompanied by recommendations aiming at converging towards consistent transdisciplinary approaches and synergies between the implementation of this Regulation and other sectoral regulations. The report shall be communicated to the European Parliament and to the Council.

7.   In the context of market investigations into new services and new practices, the high-level group may provide expertise to the Commission on the need to amend, add or remove rules in this Regulation, to ensure that digital markets across the Union are contestable and fair.