keyboard_tab Digital Market Act 2022/1925 EN

1.   Where the gatekeeper demonstrates in a reasoned request that compliance with a specific obligation laid down in Article 5, 6 or 7 for a core_platform_service listed in the designation decision pursuant to Article 3(9) would endanger, due to exceptional circumstances beyond the gatekeeper’s control, the economic viability of its operation in the Union, the Commission may adopt an implementing act setting out its decision to exceptionally suspend, in whole or in part, the specific obligation referred to in that reasoned request (‘the suspension decision’). In that implementing act, the Commission shall substantiate its suspension decision by identifying the exceptional circumstances justifying the suspension. That implementing act shall be limited to the extent and the duration necessary to address such threat to the gatekeeper’s viability. The Commission shall aim to adopt that implementing act without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 50(2).

2.   Where suspension is granted pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall review its suspension decision every year, unless a shorter interval is specified in that decision. Following such a review the Commission shall either wholly or partly lift the suspension, or decide that the conditions in paragraph 1 continue to be met.

3.   In cases of urgency, the Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper, provisionally suspend the application of a specific obligation referred to in paragraph 1 to one or more individual core_platform_services already prior to the decision pursuant to that paragraph. Such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the Commission pursuant to paragraph 1.

4.   In assessing the request referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3, the Commission shall take into account, in particular, the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the Union as well as on third parties, in particular SMEs and consumers. The suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the Commission in order to ensure a fair balance between those interests and the objectives of this Regulation.

1.   The Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative, adopt an implementing act setting out its decision, to exempt that gatekeeper, in whole or in part, from a specific obligation laid down in Article 5, 6 or 7 in relation to a core_platform_service listed in the designation decision pursuant to Article 3(9), where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 3 of this Article (‘the exemption decision’). The Commission shall adopt the exemption decision within 3 months after receiving a complete reasoned request and shall provide a reasoned statement explaining the grounds for the exemption. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 50(2).

2.   Where an exemption is granted pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall review its exemption decision if the ground for the exemption no longer exists or at least every year. Following such a review, the Commission shall either wholly or partially lift the exemption, or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met.

3.   An exemption pursuant to paragraph 1 may only be granted on grounds of public health or public security.

4.   In cases of urgency, the Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative, provisionally suspend the application of a specific obligation referred to in paragraph 1 to one or more individual core_platform_services already prior to the decision pursuant to that paragraph. Such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the Commission pursuant to paragraph 1.

5.   In assessing the request referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4, the Commission shall take into account, in particular, the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the grounds in paragraph 3, as well as the effects on the gatekeeper concerned and on third parties. The Commission may subject the suspension to conditions and obligations in order to ensure a fair balance between the goals pursued by the grounds in paragraph 3 and the objectives of this Regulation.

1.   The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 49 to supplement this Regulation with regard to the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6. Those delegated acts shall be based on a market investigation pursuant to Article 19 that has identified the need to keep those obligations up to date in order to address practices that limit the contestability of core_platform_services or that are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6.

2.   The scope of a delegated act adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 shall be limited to:

(a)	extending an obligation that applies only in relation to certain core_platform_services, to other core_platform_services listed in Article 2, point (2);

(b)	extending an obligation that benefits certain business_users or end_users so that it benefits other business_users or end_users;

(c)	specifying the manner in which the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 are to be performed by gatekeepers in order to ensure effective compliance with those obligations;

(d)	extending an obligation that applies only in relation to certain services provided together with, or in support of, core_platform_services to other services provided together with, or in support of, core_platform_services;

(e)	extending an obligation that applies only in relation to certain types of data to apply in relation to other types of data;

(f)	adding further conditions where an obligation imposes certain conditions on the behaviour of a gatekeeper; or

(g)	applying an obligation that governs the relationship between several core_platform_services of the gatekeeper to the relationship between a core_platform_service and other services of the gatekeeper.

3.   The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 49 to amend this Regulation with regard to the list of basic functionalities identified in Article 7(2), by adding or removing functionalities of number-independent_interpersonal_communications_services.

Those delegated acts shall be based on a market investigation pursuant to Article 19 that has identified the need to keep those obligations up to date in order to address practices that limit the contestability of core_platform_services or that are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in Article 7.

4.   The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 49 to supplement this Regulation in respect of the obligations in Article 7 by specifying the manner in which those obligations are to be performed in order to ensure effective compliance with those obligations. Those delegated acts shall be based on a market investigation pursuant to Article 19, which has identified the need to keep those obligations up to date in order to address practices that limit the contestability of core_platform_services or that are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in Article 7.

5.   A practice as referred to in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 shall be considered to limit the contestability of core_platform_services or to be unfair where:

(a)

that practice is engaged in by gatekeepers and is capable of impeding innovation and limiting choice for business_users and end_users because it: (i) affects or risks affecting the contestability of a core_platform_service or other services in the digital_sector on a lasting basis due to the creation or strengthening of barriers to entry for other undertakings or to expand as providers of a core_platform_service or other services in the digital_sector; or (ii) prevents other operators from having the same access to a key input as the gatekeeper; or

(b)	there is an imbalance between the rights and obligations of business_users and the gatekeeper obtains an advantage from business_users that is disproportionate to the service provided by that gatekeeper to those business_users.

1.   In the non-compliance decision, the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10 % of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper, intentionally or negligently, fails to comply with:

(a)	any of the obligations laid down in Articles 5, 6 and 7;

(b)	measures specified by the Commission in a decision adopted pursuant to Article 8(2);

(c)	remedies imposed pursuant to Article 18(1);

(d)	interim measures ordered pursuant to Article 24; or

(e)	commitments made legally binding pursuant to Article 25.

2.   Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, in the non-compliance decision the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines up to 20 % of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that a gatekeeper has committed the same or a similar infringement of an obligation laid down in Article 5, 6 or 7 in relation to the same core_platform_service as it was found to have committed in a non-compliance decision adopted in the 8 preceding years.

3.   The Commission may adopt a decision, imposing on undertakings, including gatekeepers where applicable, and associations of undertakings, fines not exceeding 1 % of their total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently:

(a)	fail to provide within the time limit information that is required for assessing their designation as gatekeepers pursuant to Article 3 or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information;

(b)	fail to comply with the obligation to notify the Commission according to Article 3(3);

(c)	fail to notify information or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information that is required pursuant to Article 14;

(d)	fail to submit the description or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information that is required pursuant to Article 15;

(e)	fail to provide access to data, algorithms or information about testing in response to a request made pursuant to Article 21(3);

(f)	fail to supply the information requested within the time limit fixed pursuant to Article 21(3) or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or explanations that are requested pursuant to Article 21 or given in an interview pursuant to Article 22;

(g)	fail to rectify within a time limit set by the Commission, incorrect, incomplete or misleading information given by a representative or a member of staff, or fail or refuse to provide complete information on facts relating to the subject-matter and purpose of an inspection, pursuant to Article 23;

(h)	refuse to submit to an inspection pursuant to Article 23;

(i)	fail to comply with the obligations imposed by the Commission pursuant to Article 26;

(j)	fail to introduce a compliance function in accordance with Article 28; or

(k)	fail to comply with the conditions for access to the Commission’s file pursuant to Article 34(4).

4.   In fixing the amount of a fine, the Commission shall take into account the gravity, duration, recurrence, and, for fines imposed pursuant to paragraph 3, delay caused to the proceedings.

5.   When a fine is imposed on an association of undertakings taking account of the worldwide turnover of its members and that association is not solvent, it shall be obliged to call for contributions from its members to cover the amount of the fine.

Where such contributions have not been made to the association of undertakings within a time limit set by the Commission, the Commission may require payment of the fine directly by any of the undertakings whose representatives were members of the decision-making bodies concerned of that association.

After having required payment in accordance with the second subparagraph, the Commission may require payment of the balance by any of the members of the association of undertakings, where necessary to ensure full payment of the fine.

However, the Commission shall not require payment pursuant to the second or the third subparagraph from undertakings which show that they have not implemented the decision of the association of undertakings that infringed this Regulation, and either were not aware of its existence, or have actively distanced themselves from it before the Commission opened proceedings under Article 20.

The financial liability of each undertaking in respect of the payment of the fine shall not exceed 20 % of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year.